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PRE-DISPUTE MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
CLAUSES IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS: THE CFPB’S PROPOSED 
REGULATION AND ITS CONSISTENCY WITH 
THE ARBITRATION STUDY 
I. INTRODUCTION
“At all events, arbitration is more rational, just, and humane than 
the resort to the sword.”1 
Richard Cobden (1804-1865) 
Such simple times are no more.  Though long after Mr. Cobden’s 
time, the debate over pre-dispute arbitration clauses has waged for 
decades.2  Since the implementation of arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts, financial services institutions (“FIs”)3 and consumer advocates 
have been at odds over the vices and virtues of binding customers to 
resolving disputes outside of the courtroom.4  In 2010, Congress initiated 
new fodder for the debate.5  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which created the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), mandates that the 
CFPB conduct a study of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in 
1. RICHARD COBDEN, SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, VOL. 2, at 170 (John
Bright & James E. Thorold Rogers, eds., 1870). 
2. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea of Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 642 (1996) (questioning 
the use of arbitration in consumer contexts). 
3. Throughout this Note “FI” refers to financial services institutions that serve
consumers and are subject to the CFPB rulemaking authority.  See infra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
4. Compare Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and
Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 267, 318 (1995) (twenty year-old article on the vices of pre-dispute arbitration), with 
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING. L. 213, 216 
(1998) (articulating why banks should implement pre-dispute arbitration clauses). 
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012). 
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consumer financial products.6  Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the authority 
to limit or ban such clauses if it “is in the public interest and for the 
protection of consumers,” but requires that the “[f]indings in such rule 
shall be consistent with the [Arbitration Study].”7 
In March 2015, the CFPB published the Arbitration Study 
(“Arbitration Study”) called for in the statute, adding new fuel to the 
seemingly endless and irreconcilable debate.8  The CFPB, in October 
2015, took the “first step in the process of a potential rulemaking”9 and 
presented a proposed regulation before a Small Business Review Panel 
(the “Panel”).10  The proposed regulation bans class action waivers in pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and conditions the use of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses on the submission of arbitral claims and awards to the 
CFPB.11  The CFPB is also considering publishing the submitted data to 
the CFPB website.12  The CFPB proposal relies on the Arbitration Study, 
a 728-page report unparalleled by any research on pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses to date—but will all this data resolve the pre-dispute arbitration 
debate and support the CFPB’s proposed regulation?13 
6. Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5518(a).
7. Dodd-Frank § 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).  Dodd-Frank also grants the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) the authority to limit or ban pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in investment contracts, Dodd-Frank § 921(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o), 
however, the SEC has yet to take any regulatory action in this area, George Friedman, CFPB 
Issues Final Report on Arbitration, Telegraphing a Ban or Limits on Arbitration, SEC. 
ARBITRATION ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/cfpb-issues-final-
report-arbitration-telegraphing-ban-limits-arbitration-sec-follow-suit/; Michael S. Barr, 
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor Contracts, 11 NYU J. L. & BUS. 
793, 796 (SPECIAL ISSUE) 4 (2015). 
8. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS (2015) 
[hereinafter ARBITRATION STUDY]. 
9. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration
Clauses the Allow Companies to Avoid Accountability to Their Customers (Oct. 7, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-proposal-to-ban-arbitration-
clauses-that-allow-companies-to-avoid-accountability-to-their-customers/. 
10. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, 1, 5 (2015) [hereinafter SMALL 
BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING], 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-
explaining-the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf; see also infra Part II, B. 
11. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 13–
14. 
12. Id. at 1, 13–14.
13. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Newark, NJ – Field Hearing on Arbitration,
LIVESTREAM, (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2015/03/page/2/ 
(showing debate between consumer advocates and FI industry representatives when 
Arbitration Study was released); see also Sharee Eriks & Baker Donelson, The CFPB’s 
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This Note examines the CFPB’s proposed regulation and whether 
it satisfies the statutory standards set forth in Dodd-Frank.  Part II of this 
Note addresses Congress’ mandate to the CFPB to conduct a study of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and the CFPB’s process in conducting the 
Arbitration Study.14  Part II also addresses the CFPB’s authority under 
Dodd-Frank to limit or ban pre-dispute arbitration clauses, and describes 
the Panel process and the proposed regulation.15  Part III evaluates the 
proposed regulation under the statutory standards of public interest, 
protection of consumers, and consistency with the Arbitration Study.16  
Part IV addresses potential challenges to the proposed regulation.17  Part 
V suggests alternative regulation that is consistent with the Arbitration 
Study, and challenges FIs to consider an opt-in pre-dispute arbitration 
clause.18  Part VI concludes that only parts of the CFPB’s proposed 
regulation should be adopted: first, the ban on class action waivers should 
not be adopted; second, the proposed regulation conditioning the use of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses on the submission of data should be 
adopted; and, third, publication to the CFPB website should not be 
adopted.19 
II. DODD-FRANK MANDATE TO CONDUCT A STUDY AND THE CFPB’S
AUTHORITY TO MAKE A RULE 
A. The Arbitration Study
The Arbitration Study is a product of the legislation that stemmed 
from the 2008 financial crisis.20  Section 1028(a) of Dodd-Frank 
mandates that the CFPB conduct a study of pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer financial products.21 
Arbitration Study Sparks Vigorous Debate Over Next Steps in Regulating Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Sep. 28, 2015), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/flaws-and-all-cfpb-s-arbitration-study-76436/. 
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a) (2012). 
21. Dodd-Frank §§ 1011, 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5518(a).
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The Arbitration Study ordered in Dodd-Frank resulted in an 
extensive report spanning 728 pages and incorporating findings from the 
CFPB’s 2013 Preliminary Study of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.22  
The Arbitration Study focused on six consumer financial markets: credit 
cards, checking accounts, prepaid cards, private student loans, payday 
loans, and mobile wireless third-party billing.23  The CFPB gathered and 
examined data on arbitrations filed with the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”),24 individual lawsuits filed in federal court, class 
action lawsuits filed in federal and some state courts, and class action 
settlements.25  The bulk of the data for the Arbitration Study gathered was 
from January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012, and was limited to 
these six consumer financial markets.26 
Beyond the arbitrations, federal individual lawsuits, class action 
suits, and class action settlements, the CFPB also studied the features of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses and the degree of consumer knowledge of 
such clauses.27  The CFPB studied the prevalence of these clauses in each 
market, the length and complexity of each clause, and other clause 
features.28  Via a telephone survey, the CFPB gauged consumer 
22. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 9 (noting that the Arbitration Study
expands and updates some findings in the December 2013 Preliminary Study and that the 
whole Preliminary Study is appended to the Arbitration Study as Appendix A). 
23. Id. § 1.3, at 7.
24. The Arbitration Study focused on arbitration filings with the AAA, because the AAA
is the predominant consumer arbitration firm for financial products.  Id. § 1.4.1, at 10.  A 
majority of arbitration clauses in financial products specify AAA as the arbitration 
administrator.  Id. § 2.5.3, at 35 (“Counting clauses in which the AAA was listed as at least 
an option yields 83.3% of credit card arbitration clauses, 91.8% of checking account 
arbitration clauses, 94.1% of prepaid card arbitration clauses, 88.7% of storefront payday loan 
arbitration clauses, 66.7% of private student loan arbitration clauses, and 85.7% of mobile 
wireless arbitration clauses.”).  Two other arbitration administrators were mentioned in the 
Arbitration Study—JAMS, Inc., formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Services, id. at App. A, at 168, and National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)—both prominent 
arbitration firms, but neither a source of arbitration data for the Arbitration Study.  Id. § 2.5.3, 
at 35. 
25. Id. § 1.3, at 8.
26. Id. § 1.3, at 7.  There are a few exceptions in the time-frame and in the markets
included in the study, first, data regarding individual federal lawsuits was narrowed to five 
financial markets: checking accounts/debit cards, payday loans, prepaid cards, and private 
student loans.  Id. § 6.4, at 11.  Second, data regarding class actions filed included class actions 
over automobile loans.  Id.  Third, the class action settlement dataset was expanded to include 
all consumer financial markets and the time period was increased to five years, from January 
1, 2008, through December 31, 2012.  Id. § 8.3, at 8. 
27. Id. § 2, at 3.
28. Id. § 2, at 1.  The clause features the CFPB studied included: opt-out option, small
claims court carve out, administrators and arbitrators, delegation, class action terms, relief 
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awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses by inquiring whether 
consumers understood their dispute resolution options and to what extent 
dispute resolution options play into consumers’ choices between 
financial products.29 
B. CFPB Authority Under Dodd-Frank and the Rulemaking
Process
Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the authority to 
limit or ban pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses provided the limit 
or ban satisfies three statutory standards.30  The CFPB must find that such 
a rule is “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers,” and 
is “consistent with the [Arbitration Study].”31  Acting on Dodd-Frank’s 
grant of authority, the CFPB has taken the first step towards rulemaking 
by submitting an outline of regulatory proposals to the Panel.32  The 
Panel, which convened pursuant to the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement and Fairness Act (“SBREFA”),33 consists of representatives 
of the CFPB, the Small Business Administration, and the Office of 
Management and Budget, who meet with a selection of small business 
entity representatives (“SERs”) potentially affected by the proposed 
rule.34 
The SBREFA consultation process allows the CFPB to determine 
the impact of a proposal on SERs early in the rulemaking process.35  SERs 
provide the Panel with feedback regarding the economic impact of 
complying with the proposed regulation, alternatives to the regulation,36 
limits, time limits, confidentiality and nondisclosure, hearing location, costs, contingent 
minimum recovery provisions, disclosures, and arbitral appeals process.  Id. 
29. Id. § 3, at 2.
30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012). 
31. Id.
32. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 5.
33. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996 § 244, 5 U.S.C.
609(b) (2012) (addressing the impact of laws and regulations on small businesses that are 
designed for larger businesses; not exclusive to CFPB rulemaking process). 
34. 5 U.S.C. 609(b); SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING,
supra note 10, at 12–13. 
35. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 10,
12. 
36. Id. at 13.  A list of discussion issues posed to SERs can be found at: 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-representatives-providing-
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and, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, whether the regulation will increase the 
cost of credit to SERs.37  Once the Panel has convened, the Panel reports 
to the CFPB within 60 days regarding how the proposed regulations may 
impact small businesses.38  The CFPB will review the Panel report and 
the feedback from the SERs before publishing the proposed regulation 
and opening the public comment period.39 
C. The CFPB’s Proposed Regulation
The CFPB’s proposed regulation encompasses “consumer 
financial products and services that the [CFPB] oversees, including credit 
cards, checking and deposit accounts, certain auto loans, small-dollar or 
payday loans, private student loans, and some other products and services 
as well.”40  If finalized, the effective date of the rule would likely be 210 
days after publication,41 as the CFPB is considering adding an additional 
thirty days to the 180-day period set by Section 1028(d) of Dodd-Frank.42  
The effective date will depend on feedback the CFPB receives from the 
feedback-to-the-small-business-review-panel.pdf. 
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1100G(a), 5 U.S.C. § 603(d) (2012). 
38. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 13.
39. Id.
40. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter
Cordray 1], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-
richard-cordray-at-the-meeting-of-the-consumer-advisory-board/.  The businesses potentially 
affected are defined by Dodd-Frank in Section 1002 and limited by Sections 1027 and 1029 
and include “but is not limited to banks, credit unions, credit card issuers, certain auto lenders, 
small-dollar or payday lenders, auto title lenders, installment and open-end lenders, private 
student lenders, providers of other credit in certain other contexts, loan originators that are 
not creditors, providers of credit in the form of deferred third-party billing services, providers 
of certain auto leases for at least 90 days, servicers of covered credit and auto leases, 
remittance transfer providers, providers of domestic money transfer services or currency 
exchange, general-purpose reloadable prepaid card issuers, certain providers of virtual 
currency products and services, check cashing providers, credit service/repair organizations, 
debt settlement firms, providers of credit monitoring services, and debt buyers.”  SMALL 
BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 23; 
Dodd-Frank §§ 1002, 1027, 1029, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481, 5517, 5519 (2012). 
41. SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note
10, at 22.  Critics of the proposed regulation are suggesting to FIs to include an arbitration 
agreements now to avoid those contracts from being subject to the regulation.  See, e.g., 
Joseph L. Olson, et al., CFPB Takes Aim at Class Action Waivers, NAT. L. REV. (Oct. 26, 
2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/consumer-finance-protection-bureau-takes-
aim-class-action-waivers. 
42. SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note
10, at 17; Dodd-Frank § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(d). 
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Panel regarding ability to and speed with which small businesses can 
comply.43 
The CFPB’s proposed regulation proceeds in two parts.44  The 
first part precludes “pre-dispute arbitration agreements” from applying to 
“class litigation.”45  This part of the regulation requires an FI to use 
explicit language within an arbitration clause stating the clause does not 
apply to cases filed on behalf of a class unless a court has denied class 
certification or the class claims have been dismissed.46  In introducing the 
regulation, the CFPB cited to securities industry precedent noting that the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) requires arbitration 
clauses used by broker-dealers to disclaim the application of the clause to 
class litigation.47  The CFPB further explained that, to ease compliance, 
standard language would be created that FIs could adopt to meet this 
requirement.48 
The second part of the proposed regulation conditions the use of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses on the submission of arbitral data to the 
CFPB.49  The requirement specifies that both initial claim filings and 
written awards be submitted to the CFPB, so that it can understand and 
monitor consumer arbitration awards.50  The CFPB noted that compliance 
would not require any change in the conduct of arbitration proceedings 
or the content of written awards.51 
Also under consideration is whether the CFPB should publish 
submitted arbitral data on its website.52  The CFPB noted that the 
publication of arbitral data, like the ban on class action waivers, is not 
unprecedented.53  Though, AAA and JAMs do not generally publish 
claims or awards, California law requires arbitration administrators to 
publish data on arbitrations involving consumer financial products and 
43. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 22.
44. Id. at 13–14.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id.
47. Id.  FINRA has prohibited the application of arbitration clauses to class cases since
1992.  Id.  FINRA also serves as the arbitrator of broker-dealer arbitrations.  Id. 
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 5, 20.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 19–20.
53. Id. at 20–21.
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services.54  Furthermore, FINRA publishes “awards in disputes between 
customers and broker-dealers” to its website, and AAA requires the 
publication of awards in employment arbitrations and awards and filings 
of any class arbitrations.55 
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION
Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB’s proposed regulation of pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration clauses to be supported by a finding that 
such limitation “is in the public interest and for the protection of 
consumers” and that the findings are “consistent with” the Arbitration 
Study.56  Applying the statutory standard to the first part of the proposed 
regulation, the ban on class action waivers does not satisfy the statutory 
requirement because the proposal is not consistent with the Arbitration 
Study.57  Applying the statutory standard to the second part of the 
proposed regulation, the requirement that FIs using pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements submit arbitral data to the CFPB likely satisfies all 
three of the statutory requirements, while the suggestion to publish such 
data to the CFPB’s website is likely not in the public interest.58 
A. Banning Class Action Waivers in Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements
To consumer advocates, class action lawsuits are generally 
viewed as a necessary tool to protect consumers,59 leveling the playing 
field for individual consumers who may not have the means to engage an 
attorney and likely do not have a claim large enough to allow an attorney 
to take the case on contingency.60  To FIs, however, class actions do not 
level the playing field, but rather give consumers a bigger stick.61  
54. Id.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
57. See infra Part III.A.
58. See infra Part III.B, C.
59. Lauren G. Barnes, Congress Must Come to the Defense of Class Actions, LAW360
(August 21, 2015, 11:21 AM), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/aritcles/693335/congress-
must-come-to-the-defense-of-class-actions. 
60. Id.
61. Conrad Anderson IV & Gregory Cook, CFPB Arbitration Study May Be First Step
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Industry representatives point out that “[t]he cost to defend the most 
frivolous [class action] complaint is overshadowed by the potential 
exposure where these otherwise ‘minimal amounts’ are aggregated.”62  
Accordingly, FIs settle class action cases rather than litigate even 
unmeritorious claims to avoid discovery costs.63  In fact, not even one of 
the class action cases in the Arbitration Study went to trial.64 
1. Meeting the Statutory Standard: In the Public Interest and for the
Protection of Consumers 
In consumer financial products and services, the use of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses to ban class action lawsuits is widespread.65  
The Arbitration Study found that tens of millions of consumers are 
subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses66 and roughly 90% of those 
clauses preclude a claim from moving forward on a class basis. 67  Most 
consumers are subject to arbitration clauses through their credit card or 
checking account agreements—products with the highest penetration in 
the consumer financial market.68  The Arbitration Study found that while 
many FIs do not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their consumer 
agreements,69 the FIs that do are larger institutions with a greater share of 
in Unlocking Floodgates of Consumer Class-Actions, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 20, 
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfpb-arbitration-study-may-be-first-49159/. 
62. Id.
63. Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?, MAYER BROWN LLP 2–3,
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActi
onsBenefitClassMembers.pdf (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 445 n.3 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); JASON SCOTT JOHNSTON & TODD
ZYWICKI, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S ARBITRATION STUDY: A 
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE 6, 48 (Mercatus Center 2015), 
http://mercatus.org/publication/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-arbitration-study-
summary-critique. 
64. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.4, at 14.
65. Id. §§ 1.4.1, 2.5.5.
66. Id. § 1.4.1.
67. Id. § 2.5.5 (noting that “93.9% of credit card arbitration clauses, 88.5% of the
checking account arbitration clauses, 97.9% of the prepaid card arbitration clauses, 88.7% of 
the storefront payday loan arbitration clauses, 100.0% of the private student loan arbitration 
clause, and 85.7% of the mobile wireless arbitration clauses in [the CFPB’s] sample contained 
terms that expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class basis.”) (footnote omitted). 
68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: FACTSHEET (2015) [hereinafter
FACTSHEET], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-
study.pdf. 
69. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, at 7 (noting only 15.8% of credit card
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the market.70  This explains why the number of consumers subject to 
mandatory arbitration and prevented from participating in a class action 
is still quite high.71  See Appendix A for the percentage of FIs that use 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements listed by market and Appendix C for 
the percentage of pre-dispute arbitration clauses that include class action 
waivers. 
The CFPB also found consumer comprehension of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses lacking or erroneous.72  The Arbitration Study showed 
consumers do not consider dispute resolution when choosing between 
different financial products or services.73  When surveyed, 54% of 
consumers whose credit card agreements included a pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration clause did not know whether they could take their 
credit card issuer to court or not.74  Thirty-eight percent of consumers 
erroneously believed they could adjudicate their disputes in a court of law 
either individually or as a class.75  Additionally, the CFPB found that 
consumers are more likely to cancel a credit card or switch banks than try 
to take the company to court (or arbitration) when a dispute arises or is 
not otherwise resolved.76 
In support of the proposed regulation, the CFPB highlighted the 
prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration clauses that contain class action 
waivers, the lack of consumer awareness and comprehension of the terms 
of such clauses, and the low number of complaints that consumers have 
filed against FIs.77  The CFPB maintains that class action waivers limit 
issuers include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their card holder contracts). 
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 3.1, at 3–4.
73. Id. § 3.4.1, at 15.  When surveyed, no consumer mentioned dispute resolution as an
influencing factor in his or her choice of credit card.  Id.  However, when the surveyor listed 
potential factors and asked whether or not a factor influenced the respondent’s choice of credit 
card, 31% of respondents agreed affirmatively that dispute resolution did influence his or her 
choice.  Id.  The Arbitration Study noted that there was a high chance of acquiescence 
response bias error in that percentage.  Id. §3.4.1 at 15 n.37 (“Acquiescence response bias is 
‘the tendency for survey respondents to agree with statements regardless of their content’ and 
is particularly problematic with ‘agree-disagree’ questions.”) (citing Paul J. Lavrakas, 
Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods, 2008.) 
74. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 3.  The Arbitration Study focused its
inquiry on credit cards, because credit cards have the highest penetration in the consumer-
financial market.  Id. § 3, at 2. 
75. Id. § 3.1, at 3.
76. Id. § 1.4.2, at 11.
77. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Cordray
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consumer relief and increase FI wrongdoing without lowering consumer 
prices.78  To the CFPB, the proposed ban is in the public interest and for 
the protection of consumers because it protects a consumer’s “day in 
court” and empowers “private attorneys general” to fight against FIs 
violating consumer protection laws.79 
Critics of the proposed ban, however, believe that banning class 
action waivers does not protect consumers.80  The real beneficiary of class 
actions, according to FIs, is not the consumer who can bring the “minimal 
amount[]” claim, but the attorney who is often paid 20% or more of the 
class action settlement.81  In the wake of the proposed regulation, one 
especially passionate attorney redubbed the CFPB the “Plaintiffs’ 
Lawyer Protection Bureau,” accusing the CFPB of prioritizing the needs 
of plaintiffs’ lawyers over the needs of consumers.82 
FI representatives, asserting the benefits of arbitration over class 
action litigation, believe the proposed ban will limit consumers’ access to 
arbitration.83  The proposal is being considered a “de facto ban” on all 
arbitration clauses84 because FIs will “abandon” arbitration clauses if 
class action waivers are prohibited.85  To FIs, the ban on class action 
waivers is neither in the public interest nor for the protection of 
2], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-
cordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing-20151007/; see also infra Appendix D listing the 
consumer-FI individual filings in arbitration with the AAA, in federal court, and putative class 
action cases filed in federal and some state courts. 
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Barr, supra note 7, at 812–813 (noting the “traditional use of private
litigation to enforce individual rights in the United States has become increasingly 
supplemented with public enforcement”). 
80. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Fierce Battle Ahead for the CFPB Arbitration Plan, AM. 
BANKER, at 2, Oct. 8, 2015 (noting the head of the Consumer Bankers Association, Richard 
Hunt, is “disappointed” with the CFPB for siding with trial attorneys). 
81. Anderson, supra note 61.  During the five-year span of the CFPB’s study of class
actions, the CFPB found that consumers were awarded $2.7 billion in relief and 18% of that 
relief went to their attorneys.  FACTSHEET, supra note 68; see also ARBITRATION STUDY, supra 
note 8, § 1.4.7. 
82. Andrew Pincus, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer Protection Bureau, INSIDEARM (Oct. 9,
2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.insidearm.com/daily/credit-card-accounts-receivable/credit-
card-receivables/the-plaintiffs-lawyer-protection-bureau/. 
83. Alan Kaplinsky, Our Thoughts on Director Cordray’s Comments to the CFPB
Consumer Advisory Board, BALLARD SPAHR CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. GROUP: CFPB MONITOR 
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/our-thoughts-on-director-
cordrays-arbitration-comments-to-the-cfpbs-consumer-advisory-board/. 
84. Id.
85. Adler, supra note 80.
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consumers because it effectively robs consumers of a “quick, efficient 
and inexpensive” means of dispute resolution.86  Furthermore, FI 
representatives find no need for the ban when consumers who would 
prefer no limitations in their dispute resolution options may select a 
product or service that does not include a pre-dispute arbitration clause.87 
FI representatives further critique the CFPB’s claim that class 
action waivers increase FI wrongdoing—dismissing the belief that FIs 
get a free pass when they are subject to “unprecedented regulation.”88  FI 
representative Alan Kaplinsky “chided” Director Cordray for using the 
term “free pass,” because he found the term “inflammatory and 
misleading.”89 
If taken at face value, the CFPB’s reasoning demonstrates that the 
proposed ban satisfies the first and second statutory standards set forth in 
Dodd-Frank: if class action waivers increase FI wrongdoing and prevent 
consumer relief, then banning class action waivers is in the public interest 
and for the protection of consumers.90  However, FIs would argue that the 
ban is not in the public interest and for the protection of consumers, 
because it would increase consumer prices or effectively eliminate an 
efficient dispute resolution process for consumers, while benefiting class 
action lawyers.91 
In arriving at such diametrically opposed conclusions, both FIs 
and the CFPB rely on the Arbitration Study.92  However, just because the 
CFPB is relying on the Arbitration Study does not mean that the proposed 
regulation is “consistent” with the Arbitration Study, as the third statutory 
86. Kaplinsky, supra note 83.
87. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, at 7 (noting only 15.8% of credit card
issuers include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their card holder contracts). 
88. Rob Berger, The CFPB Declares War on Arbitration, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertberger/2015/10/18/the-cfpb-declares-war-on-
arbitration/3/. 
89. Tim Bauer, No Surprises At the CFPB’s Arbitration Hearing, INSIDEARM (Oct. 8,
2015), http://www.insidearm.com/opinion/no-surprises-at-cfpbs-arbitration-field-hearing/. 
90. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
91. See, e.g., Tina Orem, CFPB Proposal Could Strike Credit Unions, CREDIT UNION
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.cutimes.com/2015/10/24/cfpb-proposal-could-strike-
credit-unions. 
92. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky on behalf of Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Bankers
Ass’n, and Fin. Services Roundtable, to Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 3 (July 13, 2015), http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/r?Open=jbar-9ydsbc; Cordray 2, supra 
note 77. 
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standard requires.93 
2. Meeting the Statutory Standard: The Findings of Such Rule Shall Be
Consistent with the Arbitration Study 
While the CFPB promoted the proposed regulation as consistent 
with the Arbitration Study, FIs disagree.94  In the CFPB’s view, the major 
finding of the Arbitration Study—and point of contention with FIs—is 
that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses “restrict consumer relief in 
disputes with financial companies by limiting class actions that provide 
millions of dollars in redress [to consumers] each year.”95  In contrast, FI 
representatives believe that the Arbitration Study demonstrates that 
“[a]rbitration is faster, less expensive, and more effective than litigation, 
including class action litigation, and [consumers] are far more likely to 
obtain a decision on the merits and [receive] more meaningful relief.”96 
Although the amount that FIs spend in class action settlements 
and the number of “eligible” class members97 is high, perhaps these 
numbers should not be accepted at face value.98  A factsheet published 
alongside the Arbitration Study (“the Factsheet”)99 highlights that, from 
2008 to 2012, 32 million consumers were eligible for relief in class action 
93. See infra Part III.A.2; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012). 
94. Compare Cordray 2, supra note 77, with Kaplinsky, supra note 83.
95. CFPB Study Finds that Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU: NEWSROOM (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-
limit-relief-for-consumers/. 
96. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3; see JAMES R. MCGUIRE & NANCY 
R. THOMAS, ELIMINATING ARBITRATION CLAUSES TO BENEFIT CONSUMERS, MORRISON
FORRESTER (Oct. 20, 2015)
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2015/10/151020CFPBArbitrationRulemaki
ng.pdf (discussing how the CFPB’s report seems to show the benefits to arbitration over
litigation).
97. An eligible class member will not necessarily recover.  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 8, § 8.3.3, at 27, 28 n. 46.  Generally, an eligible class member is sent notification then 
must make a claim for relief, though sometimes class members are identified and payments 
are automatic.  Id.  Data on the claims rate in consumer financial class action settlements is 
not easily accessible or documented in one place.  Id.  § 8.3.4, at 30.  One class action 
settlement administrator indicated claims rate was 5% while a different class action settlement 
administrator had a higher rate of 40% or 50% of eligible class members claiming their relief. 
Id.  § 8.3.4, 30–31. 
98. Compare FACTSHEET, supra note 68, with JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
99. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
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settlements in federal court each year.100  Over the five-year period, 160 
million consumers were eligible for relief, and settlement relief totaled 
$2.7 billion.101  The factsheet also highlighted the unmeasured additional 
relief that may have resulted from FIs changing their behavior.102 
Notably, the $2.7 billion in total relief encompasses cash relief, in kind 
relief, cy pres relief,103 and references the gross amount, before attorneys’ 
fees and costs are subtracted.104  Furthermore, FI representatives argue 
that these numbers are not predictive of future class settlement payouts.105  
The class settlement data included a handful of extra-large class action 
cases that skewed the data by substantially increasing the number of 
eligible class members and the amount of recovery.106 
When considering the benefits of class action settlements to 
consumers, the Arbitration Study highlighted that 60% of class actions 
brought are settled with the individual claimant, providing no relief to the 
other class members.107  Where class members did recover, FI 
representatives highlight the low amount of individual recovery, 
especially when compared to individual recovery in arbitration. 108  The 
Arbitration Study showed that cash payments in class action settlements 
equaled $1.1 billion109 which, divided between 34 million class members, 
reflects an average individual recovery of $32.35.110  By comparison, the 
100. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  This number is based on the class settlement data, which
included all consumer financial class settlements, not just the six markets, and thus is perhaps 
not a helpful or equal comparison.  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8, at 2.  This number 
seems to have no bearing on whether those “eligible” consumers had agreed to arbitration 
clauses.  Id. 
101. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Cy pres relief is relief paid to charitable organizations on behalf of class members.
Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?, supra note 63, at 6. 
104. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.1, at 4, § 8.3.5, at 32.
105. JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
106. Id.; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.3.2, at 15, n.36.
107. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
108. Id. at 4.
109. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.1, at 4, n.5.  Total relief, which include cash,
in-kind, cy pres, and attorneys’ fees.  FACTSHEET, supra note 68.  Cash relief “includes cash 
payments to class members, debt forbearance for class members, and class expenses and fees 
paid for by defendants as part of the settlement.  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8,  § 8.1, at 
4, n.5.  For 28 settlements that provided for a cy pres payment for the benefit of class members 
but no payment directly to class members, cash relief also includes the amount of the cy pres 
payment.  Id.  In kind relief refers to FIs giving free or discounted access to a service, such as 
credit monitoring.  Id. 
110. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 4.
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average individual recovery in arbitration was $5,389.111 
In order to conclude that class actions provide superior relief to 
consumers over arbitration, the CFPB did not compare average individual 
recovery, but instead compared overall class settlement recovery to the 
arbitration data.112  However, such arbitration data is based solely on 
arbitral awards—decisions made by an arbitrator on the merits—as 
opposed settlements agreed upon between parties.113  During the three-
year time period of the Arbitration Study, 1,847 arbitrations were filed.114  
Only 32% of those arbitration cases ended in an arbitral award with a 
decision on the merits.115  Less than 25% of the arbitrations settled and 
the remainder were not clearly resolved—either deemed dormant or 
perpetually pending.116  In cases where the arbitration reached a decision 
on the merits, consumers recovered just under $400,000,117 far less than 
the $2.8 million in arbitral awards recovered by FIs.118  However, these 
amounts do not include consumer relief in up to 66% of arbitrations that 
settled.119  Furthermore, the Arbitration Study noted that the low amount 
111. Id.
112. Richard Cordray, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015) [hereinafter
Cordray 3], http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-
richard-cordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing/; FACTSHEET, supra note 68; see also 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.6, at 32, § 8 (addressing the outcome of arbitrations 
studied and the value of class settlements respectively). 
113. FACTSHEET, supra note 68.
114. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.1, at 9.  This number includes arbitrations
filed by the consumer, the FI, or mutually submitted.  Id.; see also infra Appendix D. 
115. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.1, at 9.
116. Id.  The Arbitration Study noted that 34% of the arbitrations not clearly resolved
showed signs consistent with settlement, raising the likely percentage of settled arbitrations 
to 66%.  Id. § 5.2.2, at 11. 
117. Id.  (“The total amount of affirmative relief awarded was $172,433 and total debt
forbearance was $189,107.”). 
118. Id. § 1.4.3, at 12; FACTSHEET, supra note 68.  The amount of arbitral awards to
consumers compared to the amount of arbitral awards to FIs may not be so astounding when 
the type of dispute is considered.  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8,  § 1.4.3, at 12.  In 227 
of the 244 of the cases where FIs made claims or counterclaims, arbitrators awarded relief to 
the FIs for a total of $2.8 million.  Id.  However, 40% of all of the arbitrations filed were 
disputes over debts, id., and the cases where FIs were awarded $2.8 million were 
“predominantly for disputed debts.”  FACTSHEET, supra note 68.  The question then remains, 
is it so surprising that the outcome over such disputes is consumers having to pay what they 
owe?  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8,  § 1.4.3.  Perhaps still troubling is the percentage 
of wins FIs have over consumers in these cases, but that issue raises a worrisome allegation 
that the AAA is not a neutral arbitrator, which is not a light accusation nor supported by the 
Arbitration Study data or incorporated in the CFPB finding.  See Cordray 3, supra note 111 
(emphasizing the difference in recovery). 
119. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 5.2.2, at 11, 13.
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of consumer recovery in arbitral awards likely reflects FI settlement 
strategy.120  Since an FI is more likely to settle a claim where the 
consumer has a strong chance of winning, the arbitral award data is not 
indicative of total consumer recovery.121  Thus, looking at arbitral awards 
versus class action settlements is an apples-to-oranges comparison,122 
which fails to establish that the ban on class action waivers is “consistent” 
with the Arbitration Study.123 
The CFPB also reasoned that pre-dispute arbitration clauses that 
ban class action waivers do not lower consumer prices.124  However, the 
Arbitration Study established that proving a correlation between 
arbitration clauses and pricing is near impossible.125  The Arbitration 
Study noted that arbitration provides cost saving to FIs.126  Whether by 
reducing court costs and attorneys’ fees inherent in extensive discovery 
and litigation, or by limiting an FI’s exposure to aggregated claims, pre-
dispute arbitration clauses likely save FIs money.127  The CFPB looked 
to whether these cost savings are passed through to consumers—
attempting to probe the argument that consumers benefit from pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses even when consumers are unaware of the clauses’ 
existence.128  The CFPB recognized the difficulty in proving the “pass-
through” effect because so many factors affect pricing.129  Moreover, 
even if a correlation between lower prices and pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses were found, it would not be dispositive of a relation between the 
two because of the multitude of factors affecting pricing.130 
Lastly, the CFPB’s proposal to ban class action waivers is likely 
not consistent with the Arbitration Study because it relies on conclusions 
120. Id. § 5.1, at 6.  The CFPB recognized the limitation in its data by noting that
“[b]ecause [its] ability to review substantive outcomes is generally limited to arbitration 
decisions on the merits, the substantive outcomes of most consumer financial arbitration 
disputes are unknown and largely unknowable to reviewers.”  Id. 
121. Id.
122. JOHNSTON & ZYWICKI, supra note 63, at 7.
123. MCGUIRE & THOMAS, supra note 96, at 2.
124. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
125. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 10, at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 10, at 3–4.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 10, at 2.
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never addressed in the Arbitration Study.131  The Arbitration Study found 
that many consumers do not resort to arbitration or litigation when a 
dispute arises with an FI, but did not address why this is the case.132  The 
CFPB has drawn the conclusion that consumers are not filing individual 
suits or arbitration claims against their FIs either because consumers think 
their claims are too small to be worthwhile or because the harm imposed 
on consumers by FIs is going undetected.133  There could be truth in the 
CFPB’s speculation, but theorizing why claims are not being filed may 
not give the CFPB the authority to ban class action waivers—just because 
the Arbitration Study is not inconsistent does not necessarily render it 
consistent.134  For the proposed ban on class action waivers to be 
consistent with the Arbitration Study, further research must be done to 
definitively establish the CFPB’s conclusions.135  At this point, the 
proposed ban should not be adopted.136 
B. Conditioning the Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements on
the Submission of Arbitral Claims and Awards to the CFPB
Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements on the 
submission of arbitral claims and awards to the CFPB satisfies the first 
and second statutory requirements set forth in Dodd-Frank.137  It is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers to collect further data 
regarding consumer arbitration based on the prevalence of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses and the lack of consumer awareness and 
comprehension of the terms of such clauses.138  By requiring companies 
to provide data on arbitral claims and awards, the CFPB believes it can 
monitor individual arbitration for unfairness.139  Even FIs agree that the 
131. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 14;
see also MCGUIRE & THOMAS, supra note 96, at 2 (“Nor does the [Arbitration Study] seem to 
support its conclusion that consumers benefit from class litigation any more than they do from 
individual arbitration.”). 
132. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.2, at 11.
133. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 14.
134. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
135. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Dodd-Frank § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).
138. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.1, at 3.
139. Cordray 2, supra note 77.  In support of the need to monitor arbitration for potential
unfairness to consumers, the CFPB and consumer advocates make reference to the 
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CFPB should conduct further research.140  The submission of arbitral 
claims and awards is less research than FIs desire, but it is a move toward 
filling the gaps in the Arbitration Study.141  Critics may argue that the 
proposed regulation would increase consumer prices because the cost of 
the proposed regulation may be passed through to consumers; however, 
since the CFPB is not requiring any change in the arbitral proceeding or 
written rewards the cost is likely limited.142 
Additionally, this section of the proposed regulation likely 
controversial history of the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”).  See SMALL BUSINESS 
REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 19; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, LIVESTREAM, supra note 13 (warning against repeat NAF debacle).  NAF was 
accused of being overly FI-friendly, resulting in unfair arbitral results for consumers.  
Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 111th Cong. (July 22, 2009) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney, Public 
Justice) (“NAF pursued the business of debt collection arbitrations by cultivating relationships 
with and the favor of creditors, fundamentally to the detriment of consumers.”).  Previously a 
significant consumer arbitration firm, NAF stopped arbitrating consumer disputes.  Matthew 
R. Salzwedel & Devona Wells, National Arbitration Forum Settlement with Minnesota
Attorney General, 1 ST. AG TRACKER, 4 (2009).  “[NAF’s] decision to end its consumer-
arbitration business resulted from a settlement it reached with the State of Minnesota less than
a week after the [State] Attorney General [] sued the company . . . accusing the company
of violating Minnesota’s consumer-fraud, deceptive-trade-practices, and false advertising
statutes.”  Id.; see also SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra
note 10, at 19 (noting the allegations arose from the firm’s common ownership with a number
of FIs involved in the arbitration).
140. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.  Some of the areas FI representatives
requested the CFPB investigate further include customer satisfaction with arbitration, cash 
awards to individual members of a class, the economic consequences to customers and 
companies if pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses are banned, whether recent United 
States Supreme Court cases which make it harder to receive class certification limit the 
amount of relief class actions could potentially provide, the impact of the CFPB’s own 
enforcement actions, and customer experience with arbitration in areas where arbitration has 
had the chance to develop further, such as employment. Id.  There is also a potential for 
unfairness when arbitrators are chosen for their specialty in the field; connection to the 
industry tends towards finding in favor of the industry.  See Barr, supra note 7, at 811.  A 
recent study showed that arbitrators chosen for their specialty in securities had a “significant 
impact” on the arbitral award.  Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator 
Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43 (2014)). 
141. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
142. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 20.
A reevaluation may be required after the Panel process, as such a limited cost may still prove 
too great for some small businesses, and undermine the public interest of this section of the 
proposed regulation.  See James H. Carter & John V. H. Pierce, Have Class Arbitration Found 
New Life? NY L. J., Nov. 16, 2015, 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202742253268/Have-Class-Arbitrations-Found-
New-Life?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (noting arbitral data submission may prove 
“significant expense for small businesses”). 
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satisfies the third statutory requirement.143  Though the absence of data 
does not render the ban on class actions waivers consistent with the 
Arbitration Study, less data or missing data is consistent with the proposal 
to collect more data. 
C. Publishing Arbitral Claims and Awards to the CFPB Website
The CFPB couched the possibility of publicizing arbitral data to 
its website in the second part of the proposed regulation—it did not 
introduce it as a separate and distinct proposal.144  However, the finding 
for this part of the regulation is different and likely does not meet the 
second or third statutory requirement of Dodd-Frank.145 
The CFPB maintains that publication will add an extra layer of 
consumer protection by shedding “the sunlight of public scrutiny” on FI-
consumer arbitration.146  Citing its current practice of publishing 
consumer complaints on its website, the CFPB reasons that “greater 
transparency of information” improves customer service and helps 
“identify patterns in the treatment of consumers, leading to stronger 
compliance mechanisms.”147  Despite this benefit to consumers, 
publishing arbitral claims on the CFPB’s website may not be in the public 
interest and for the protection of consumers.148 
A cited benefit to arbitration is the private nature of the process.149  
While the CFPB and others see this as a negative,150 suggesting it allows 
FIs to conceal wrongdoing, 151 the element of confidentiality may well be 
in the public interest because it protects an FI’s reputation against 
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
144. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 19.
145. Dodd-Frank § 1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a).
146. Cordray 2, supra note 77.
147. SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 20,
n.57.
148. See Amy Schmitz, Assuming Silence In Arbitration, 268 N.J. LAWYER 16, 17 (2011)
(noting one potential benefit of privacy in arbitration is to prevent public embarrassment or 
humiliation). 
149. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010)
(noting that a class arbitration proceeding eradicates the benefit of privacy in arbitration). 
150. See e.g., Barr, supra note 7, at 809 (noting that the lack of transparency in arbitration
is problematic, because consumers have a harder time understanding why the arbitrator 
arrived at a decision or proving that the arbitrator misapplied the law). 
151. Cordray 2, supra note 77; Barr, supra note 7, at 810.
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potentially baseless accusations.  Where data regarding disputes concerns 
a depository institution, the FI’s reputation may affect consumer 
confidence, which could in turn affect a consumer’s choice to deposit 
with that institution.152  The CFPB would argue that this “public 
spotlight” is a positive outcome because it keeps FIs in line,153 but not all 
juicy headlines are indicative of actual FI behavior and the continued 
erosion of consumer confidence in FIs may not be in the public interest. 
FIs would argue further that publicizing arbitral data is less for 
the protection of consumers and more for the protection of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.154  Providing easy access to arbitral claims would likely 
increase the number of class actions brought against FIs.155  Anyone 
looking to bring a claim need only pull up the CFPB website and see what 
claims are hot right now.156  This part of the regulation adds support to 
the FI representatives’ position that the proposed regulation benefits 
plaintiffs’ attorneys—and not consumers—and, therefore, should not be 
adopted. 
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED REGULATION
Critics of the proposed regulation speculate that the CFPB lacks 
the authority to ban class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses, 
not because of a failure to satisfy the statutory standards, but because the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) prevents it from doing so.157  
Without a congressional amendment to the FAA, critics insist the CFPB’s 
152. See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and The Banking System, 35 AM. 
U. L. REV. 647, 667 (Spring 1986) (arguing for the continued separation of commercial and
investment banking, but noting the connection between consumer confidence and health of
depository institutions).
153. Cordray 1, supra note 40, at 2.
154. Adler, supra note 80.
155. See ANTHONY E. DIRESTA, BRIAN J. GOODRICH, RACHEL E. MUELLER, HOLLAND &
KNIGHT LLP, CLIENT ALERT: CFPB PROPOSES LIMITS ON COMPANIES’ USE OF ARBITRATION
CLAUSES (2015), https://m.hklaw.com/publications/cfpb-proposes-limits-on-companies-use-
of-arbitration-clauses-10-22-2015/ (recommending companies “consider their new exposure 
to class action litigation”). 
156. See id. (noting publication of arbitral awards on the CFPB website highlights
“prohibited business practices”). 
157. Id.; Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Jessica Karmasek,
The Legality of CFPB’s Plan for Proposed Ban on Arbitration Clauses in Question, LEGAL 
NEWS LINE (Dec. 4, 2015) http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510649484-legality-of-cfpb-s-
plan-for-proposed-ban-on-arbitration-clauses-in-question. 
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proposed regulation would contravene the statute.158  The FAA specifies 
that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”159 
The response to the contravention challenge is that Dodd-Frank 
supersedes the FAA and is the congressional amendment critics 
demand.160  Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank explicitly provides that the 
CFPB “may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an 
agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer 
financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute 
between the parties.”161  A court determining the validity of the CFPB’s 
proposed regulation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements would look to 
Dodd-Frank, not the FAA, as Dodd-Frank is an act of Congress 
subsequent to the FAA and explicitly addresses arbitration.162 
Critics may argue that Congress’ grant of authority to the CFPB 
regarding arbitration is “an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to 
an agency.”163  The argument being that it is impermissible for Congress 
“to transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it is thus 
vested”164—in this case, the power to amend the FAA.165  The standard 
158. Karmesek, supra note 157.
159. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
160. Jeff Sovern, Experts Disagree Over Whether the Earth is Flat and CFPB Has the
Authority to Regulate Arbitration Clauses, PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 
19, 2015), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2015/10/experts-disagree-over-whether-earth-
is-flat-and-cfpb-has-power-to-regulate-arbitration-clauses.html. 
161. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1028(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
162. Sovern, supra note 160; see also Barr, supra note 7, at 817.
163. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Responding to Professor Sovern: How Dodd-Frank Section 1028
limits the CFPB’s Power to Regulate Arbitration Agreements, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CFPB 
MONITOR (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/responding-to-
professor-sovern-how-dodd-frank-section-1028-limits-the-cfpbs-power-to-regulate-
arbitration-agreements/; Marc James Ayers, Can the CFPB Really Prohibit Pre-dispute 
Arbitration Agreements? BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP: FINANCIAL SERVICES
PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 26, 2015) https://www.financialservicesperspectives.com/2015/03/can-
the-cfpb-really-prohibit-pre-dispute-arbitration-agreements/ (raising the unconstitutional 
delegation of power argument regarding a total ban of arbitration, before the October 2015 
rule was proposed). 
164. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
165. See Ayers, supra note 163 (describing a potential ban on consumer-financial
arbitration clauses as a repeal of the FAA). 
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for evaluating a delegation challenge is whether, in delegating its power, 
Congress guided the agency’s discretion with “intelligible principles.”166  
This is a very permissive standard.167  Since the inception of the 
intelligible principle standard in the New Deal era, when the Supreme 
Court invoked the standard to strike down three laws in three cases, the 
Supreme Court has yet to find any other laws that fail to provide an 
intelligible principle.168  Facing such a permissive standard, the unlawful 
delegation argument seems unlikely to gain traction.169 
Both sides recognize, however, that the current Supreme Court 
favors arbitration.170  In AT&T Mobility LLC. v Concepcion,171 the 
Supreme Court enforced the arbitration clause by holding that the FAA 
preempted a California doctrine that found certain arbitration clauses that 
contain class actions waivers unconscionable.172  Most recently, in Direct 
TV Inc. v. Imburgia,173 the Court reemphasized its holding in Concepcion 
and held that even where the terms of the arbitration clause rely on the 
“laws of your state,” those laws, and the validity of the arbitration clause, 
are still subject to the FAA and federal preemption.174  Furthermore, 
between Concepcion and Imburgia, in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant,175 the Court held an arbitration clause containing a 
166. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 335 (4th ed. 2011) (citing Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Nat’l Cable Television Assoc. v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974)). 
167. See id. (“In more than 60 years since . . . Schechter, not a single federal law has
been declared an impermissible delegation of legislative power.”). 
168. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16 n.100 (1998) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–12 (1936); 
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529–42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–30 (1935)). 
169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 166 at 336 (noting the “strong consensus over the last
half century in favor of allowing broad delegations of legislative power to administrative and 
regulatory agencies of all types) (footnote omitted); Jeff Sovern, Will the Industry Attack the 
Constitutionality of the CFPB’s Power to Regulate Arbitration Clauses?, PUB. CITIZEN:
CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2015/04/will-the-industry-attack-the-constitutionality-of-
the-cfpbs-power-to-regulate-arbitration-clauses.html (asserting a lack of expertise in 
constitutional law, but finding little weight in the argument that the CFPB lacks the power to 
regulate). 
170. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (enforced
arbitration clause); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311–12 (2013) 
(enforced arbitration clause). 
171. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
172. Id. at 1752.
173. Direct TV Inc., v. Imburgia, No. 14-462, slip op (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015).
174. Imburgia, slip op at 10-11.
175. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304.
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class action waiver as valid and enforceable under FAA notwithstanding 
a showing of financial hardship on the plaintiff.176 
Despite the Court’s favorable treatment of arbitration clauses, the 
predicted FAA challenge177 and the unlawful delegation argument will 
likely not prevail.178  By granting the CFPB the authority to limit or ban 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, Congress shifted its previous stance and 
created an exception to the FAA’s general enforcement of arbitration 
clauses.179  Unlike Concepcion or Imburgia, the challenge is not of state 
law but federal regulation.180  Based on history, the unlawful delegation 
argument will have little bite.181 
V. ALTERNATIVES
The Arbitration Study data window—January 1, 2010, through 
December 31, 2012—is especially interesting, because Concepcion was 
decided in 2011.182  Dismayed at the holding, consumer advocates 
worried that Concepcion would result in the inclusion of a pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration clause in every consumer contract because FAA 
preempted state law regarding arbitration.183  However, based on the data 
gathered from 2012 and 2013 in the Arbitration Study, the Concepcion 
holding has been just a ripple in the rise of arbitration clauses, compared 
to the tidal wave consumer advocates feared.184 
Concepcion, however, did leave its mark.185  Many of the 
consumer-friendly features of current pre-dispute arbitration clauses are 
attributed to Concepcion.186  The commercial response to the Concepcion 
176. Id. at 2311–12.  The plaintiff failed to convince the Court that he should be able to
bring a class action claim when the cost of “individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim” 
would cost him more than he could possibly recover.  Id. at 2307, 2312. 
177. Adler, supra note 80.
178. Sovern, supra note 160.
179. Id.
180. AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011); Direct TV Inc., v.
Imburgia, No. 14-462, slip op (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015). 
181. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 166, at 336
182. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
183. Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 844–
48 (2012). 
184. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3.1.
185. Gilles, supra note 183, at 844–46.
186. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Gilles, supra note 183, at 825.
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Court’s praise of the consumer-friendly features—such as covering filing 
fees and providing cash bounties—was to add these features to their own 
arbitration clauses sua sponte to mirror the arbitration clause upheld in 
Concepcion.187 
A. Alternative Regulation
Despite the post-Concepcion increase of consumer-friendliness, 
the Arbitration Study demonstrates that improvement is still needed in 
reducing the complexity and increasing consumer awareness and 
comprehension of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.188  Clause complexity, 
length, and features vary across the six consumer financial markets.189  
Generally, arbitration clauses tend to be more complex and require a 
higher grade level of education to understand than the rest of the 
contract.190  For example, the average Flesch Kindcaid grade level191 for 
arbitration clauses in credit card agreements is 15.6 while the rest of the 
contract is 11.8.192  Interestingly, larger FIs’ arbitration clauses are longer 
but less complex (average Flesch Kincaid grade level: 14.7) than smaller 
FIs’ arbitration clauses, which are shorter but more difficult to 
comprehend (average Flesch Kincaid grade level: 15.7).193 
One of the common arbitration clause features identified in the 
Arbitration Study, besides the class action waiver, is the opt-out option.194  
Twenty-five percent or more (depending on the market) included an opt-
out feature in the arbitration clause.195  Typically, an opt-out option 
allows a consumer thirty days to choose not to be subject to the arbitration 
clause by mailing a signed document to the issuer stating the choice to 
187. Gilles, supra note 183, at 844–46.
188. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, §§ 2.4, 3.1 (noting the complexity and lack
of consumer awareness respectively). 
189. Id.; see also infra Appendix B and C (chart of clause features).
190. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4, at 28; see also infra Appendix B (listing
the Flesch Kincaid grade levels for each markets’ contracts and arbitration clauses). 
191. As described in the Arbitration Study, the Flesch Kincaid grade level takes into
account total words, total sentence, and total syllables and based on the readability, determines 
what level of education a reader would need to understand the clause.  ARBITRATION STUDY,
supra note 8, § 2.4, at 28 n.79. 
192. Id. § 2.4, at 28.
193. Id. at Appendix A, at 28 (defining large FIs as the twenty largest issuers).
194. Id. § 2.5.1, at 31.
195. Id.
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opt out.196  Despite the prevalence of the opt-out option, the CFPB found 
most consumers are unaware of its existence,197 a fact that renders the 
consumer-friendly provision relatively toothless.  See Appendix C for a 
chart of the common features and their prevalence in pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses by market. 
Instead of banning class action waivers, the CFPB should create 
a standard pre-dispute arbitration clause that is easier to understand and 
includes the following features: (i) an opt-out option, and, where hardship 
is demonstrated, (ii) a provision that FIs will cover arbitration costs.198  
Furthermore, the standard clause should protect the judicial oversight of 
class actions by containing an anti-severability provision in the class 
action waiver, which would prevent a case from moving forward as a 
class arbitration.199  The benefit of each of these features will be discussed 
in turn. 
1. Consumer-Friendly Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clause
i. Opt-Out Option
An opt-out option should be included in every mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clause200 and the consumer should be able to opt out 
online or via telephone.201  The provision should allow that a consumer 
196. Id.
197. Id. § 3.1, at 4.  The CFPB encountered only one consumer (out of the 1,007 survey
respondents, id. at §3.3, 9) who had been made aware of his ability to opt out, and who, despite 
his awareness, chose not to opt out.  Id. § 3.4.3, 21 n.44. 
198. There are more consumer-friendly features that FIs could adopt and some have
already adopted including: choice of arbitrator, minimum contingent recovery, and small 
claims court carve outs.  Id. at § 2.  The importance of allowing a consumer to select the 
arbitrator helps avoid potential bias toward FIs. See Barr, supra note 7, at 811 (noting the 
existence of bias when the arbitrator has a background in the industry of the dispute). 
199. Id. § 2, at 46. The proposed regulation does not prevent a consumer from choosing to
move forward on a class basis through arbitration instead of through the court.  SMALL 
BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING, supra note 10, at 18.  The CFPB could 
investigate additional judicial oversight feature, namely, an anti-delegation clause, requiring 
the enforceability of an arbitration clause to be determined by a judge not an arbitrator.  See 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.4 (addressing anti-delegation).  The intricacies of 
such a proposal would require another Note to explore. 
200. See Barr, supra note 7, at 817 (noting disclosure and an opt-out option in arbitration
agreements as necessary to protect consumers, but further that the CFPB and the SEC should 
also protect consumers’ ability to seek collective relief). 
201. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, §§ 2.4, § 3.4.3, at 21, n.44 (noting the current
use of opt-out options in pre-dispute arbitration clauses and the lack of consumers that opt 
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has a minimum of thirty days to opt-out, which the FI may increase at its 
discretion.202  While this may increase an FI’s exposure to class actions, 
it ameliorates the lack of negotiation power on the part of the 
consumer.203  Since the Arbitration Study did not find a single person who 
opted-out of the arbitration clause, the effectiveness of the opt-out option 
should go hand-in-hand with increasing consumer awareness and 
understanding of arbitration clauses.204  In reality, and as demonstrated 
by the Arbitration Study, most consumers will likely choose the default 
option rather than opt out; thus, the exposure to FIs and the benefit to 
consumers would both be quite limited.205  To decrease the number of 
consumers who do not opt out because of inertia, the opt-out provision 
should allow consumers to either opt out online or via telephone.206 
ii. FI Covers Arbitration Costs
The CFPB should require FIs to cover the filing costs of 
arbitration when a consumer shows financial hardship.  The Arbitration 
Study demonstrates a wide variation in cost allocation.207  Some pre-
dispute arbitration clauses provide that the FI will cover the initial filing 
fees, while others provide that the FI may cover filing fees upon request, 
under special circumstances, or if the arbitration administrator has been 
asked and has refused to waive the initial filing fee.208  Other clauses 
provide that the losing party will pay all of the arbitration costs of the 
out). 
202. Id. § 2.5.1, at 31 (noting that current opt-out windows range from 30 to 90 days).
203. See id. § 3.2, at 7–8 (noting the lack of understanding and awareness consumers have
of their credit card agreements). 
204. Id. § 3.1, at 4.  For an alternative that addresses the toothlessness issue of an opt-out
option see supra Part IV.B, suggesting an opt-in option. 
205. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4; Steve Lohr, The Default Choice, So Hard
to Resist, NY TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, BU5 (citing RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE
(2008)); Michael S. Barr, et al., Behaviorially Informed Financial Services Regulation, NEW 
AM. FOUND. 9, 13 (Oct. 2008) 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sendhil/files/behaviorally_informed_financial_services_regu
lation.pdf (exploring opt-out options in different services and products within the financial 
services industry). 
206. Requiring the opt out option to be online or by telephone is based on the Author’s 
personal experience with extra steps usually adding to consumer inertia and an increased 
likelihood that consumers will “choose” the default option if opting out is too difficult.  See 
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 205, at 87– 89 (highlighting the power of the default option). 
207. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.10.
208. Id.
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prevailing party.209 
The low cost of arbitration is, arguably, a benefit to both 
consumers and FIs.210  The cost is lower than litigation because in 
arbitration counsel is not required,211 parties are not battling with the 
“crowded court dockets,” and, generally, discovery and motions practice 
are of shorter duration.212  Where, however, a consumer is unable to 
afford even the lower cost of arbitration and is bound by a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause, the FI should have to cover the costs of arbitration.  
Because class actions provide consumers an upfront cost-free option to 
bring claims against FIs, equity requires consumers bound to arbitration 
also have the ability to resolve their disputes even when they do not have 
the economic means.213 
2. Opportunity for Judicial Review: Anti-Severability Provision
To avoid a case moving forward as a class arbitration, the CFPB 
should condition the use of arbitration agreements on the inclusion of an 
anti-severability provision in the class action waiver.214  The anti-
severability provision would specify that if a court deems the class action 
waiver in an arbitration clause unconscionable or otherwise 
unenforceable, then the whole arbitration clause is stricken from the 
contract and parties can move forward as a class in court.215  Were a court 
allowed to strike just the class action waiver of an arbitration clause, then 
the class could move forward as a class in arbitration.216 
The reasons to avoid class arbitration were articulated by the 
209. Id.
210. Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at 3.
211. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.10.  Though representation is not required
in arbitration the Arbitration Study showed on average 62% of consumers were represented 
by counsel.  Id. § 5.5.3, at 29.  Some critics of arbitration argue that the low cost benefit is 
lost when the parties hire representation.  Barr, supra note 7, at 809. 
212. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Litigation: Arbitration v. Litigation, INSIDE COUNSEL (Apr.
19, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/04/19/litigation-arbitration-v-litigation 
(noting that speed, the collegial nature, and confidentiality are also benefits of arbitration). 
213. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 59 (articulating that class actions even the playing field
to consumers without the economic means). 
214. Id. § 2.5.5, at 46 (explaining the commonness and use of anti-severability provisions
in pre-dispute arbitration clauses). 
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Supreme Court in Concepcion.217  Class arbitration is nearly an 
oxymoron, because it so thoroughly negates the benefits of arbitration.218  
Because of the number of parties in a class arbitration, the process is 
inevitably slower, less efficient, and less private then individual 
arbitration.219  Furthermore, the Concepcion Court highlighted that 
arbitration is a poor forum in which to deal with the complexity of class 
certification.220  Arbitration lacks the appellate review process that 
protects the high stakes of the parties—whether high in number of class 
members or high in exposure to an FI.221  Therefore, conditioning the use 
of arbitration clauses on the incorporation of an anti-severability 
provision to the class waiver keeps class actions in the courtroom and out 
of arbitration.222 
3. Use of A Standard Clause Would Decrease Complexity
Finally, the Arbitration Study highlights that pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses are more complex than the rest of the contract in most 
consumer financial products.223  This should be addressed and could be 
mended with the creation of a standard clause, similar to the standard 
forms and clauses the CFPB has already promulgated for other activities 
in the consumer financial services industry.224  Without addressing the 
understanding and awareness issues, consumer-friendly conditions 
suggested (like the inclusion of an opt-out option) would remain as 
toothless as the status quo.225 
217. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
218. Id. at 352.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 352–53.
221. Id.
222. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.5, at 46 (noting the effect of an anti-
severability provision). 
223. Id. § 2.4.
224. E.g., G–1–Balance Computation Methods Model Clauses (Home–Equity Plans), 12
C.F.R. 1026, App. G (2012).
225. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 1.4.2.  Even though approximately a quarter of
arbitration clauses contain an opt-out option, the CFPB only found one consumer who had 
been made aware of his option to opt out and who opted not to.  Id. § 3.4.3, 21 n. 44. 
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4. The Alternative Regulation Under the Statutory Standards Set Forth
in Dodd-Frank 
The incorporation of features that increase consumer-friendliness 
and opportunity for judicial review as a condition to the use of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses is in line with the statutory standards set forth in Dodd-
Frank.  The standard clause with these added features is in the public 
interest and for the protection of consumers, because it allows FIs to 
continue to limit exposure to meritless class actions but not without 
certain checks to insure fairness to consumers.  The consumer may opt 
out or, if the consumer did not opt out, pursue arbitration even if he or 
she cannot afford the costs.  Arguably, these measures would increase 
costs to FIs, which may in turn raise prices for consumers.  However, 
compared to the potential exposure of banning class action waivers the 
costs would be limited.226 
Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is also 
consistent with the Arbitration Study.  The Arbitration Study highlighted 
pre-dispute arbitration clause complexity and a need to improve 
consumer awareness and comprehension.227  The Arbitration Study also 
established that consumers have a choice.228  Despite the extensive use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts, there are a significant 
number of FIs that do not include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their 
consumer contracts.229  Furthermore, the Arbitration Study demonstrated 
that, on average, individual consumers recover more in arbitration than 
in class actions.230  Thus, conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
on these protective features, instead of banning class action waivers, is 
consistent with the Arbitration Study. 
B. Proactive FI Alternative: Voluntary Opt-In Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Clause
There is one final suggestion that would be most daring for FIs, 
226. See, e.g., Orem, supra note 91 (recognizing the increased costs for credit unions in
defending against class action cases if the proposal is adopted). 
227. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4.
228. Id. § 2.3.
229. Id.
230. See supra Part III.A.iii.
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and that is to include the arbitration clause as an opt-in option.231  
Offering an opt-in option would prove the strongest display of the FI’s 
belief in the benefits of arbitration to consumers and ultimately be an end-
run on the CFPB’s proposal.  By necessity, opt-in arbitration clauses 
would be consumer-friendly to entice consumers to agree pre-dispute to 
arbitration.  To be an enforceable contract, the clause would have to 
provide consideration, which could be, inter alia, a partial rebate on the 
price paid for the product, a lower interest rate, a promise to pay dispute 
resolution costs (arbitration costs), or a contingent minimum recovery.232  
Since consumers most typically choose the default option, the enticement 
to get consumers to opt in would need to be high.233  However, the benefit 
would spread beyond the increased consumer-friendly arbitration clause.  
By default, an opt-in arbitration clause would alleviate the lack of 
consumer awareness and understanding, while continuing to recognize 
the benefits of arbitration. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the proposed regulation—and to some degree prior 
to it—anti-arbitration arguments have gained public traction.234  
However, public sentiment is not sufficient support for an agency 
regulation.  Further, parts of the proposed regulation fail to satisfy the 
statutory standards set forth in Dodd-Frank.235  The proposed regulation 
to ban class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses is not 
consistent with the Arbitration Study.236  Publishing the arbitral data to 
the CFPB website is likely not in the public interest or for the protection 
of consumers.237  Conditioning the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
231. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIVESTREAM, supra note 13 (streaming Alan
Kaplinsky’s argument that arbitration is beneficial consumers). 
232. If an arbitrator decides for the consumer in an award higher than the FIs last
settlement offer, the contingent minimum recovery guarantees a consumer a certain set 
amount of money.  ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.5.11.  In the arbitration clause at 
issue in Concepcion, the contingent minimum recovery to the consumer was $10,000.  Id. 
(citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 n.3 (2011)). 
233. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 205, at 87– 89.
234. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebelhoff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, NY TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, A1 (presenting a view against 
arbitration). 
235. See supra Part III.A., C.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. See supra Part III.C.
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agreements on the submission of arbitral claims and awards, however, 
satisfies the statutory standards, and should be adopted as a rule.238  
Instead of banning class action waivers, the CFPB should create a 
comprehensible, standard, consumer-friendly pre-dispute arbitration 
clause.239  In the event that the proposed regulation to ban class action 
waivers is adopted, an FAA contravention challenge will most likely be 
raised.240  However, a court addressing the validity of the regulation will 
likely turn to Dodd-Frank, not the FAA, which will provide an intelligible 
principle to the CFPB and not be an unlawful delegation of legislative 
power.241 
Ultimately, the consumer-FI relationship is mutually beneficial, 
despite how starkly FIs and consumer advocates disagree on the topic of 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration.242  As a final suggestion, FIs could 
choose to be proactive instead of resisting the CFPB, and create their own 
solution, even if it may sound like an oxymoron—a voluntary pre-dispute 
arbitration clause.243 
BRENNA A. SHEFFIELD 
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. See supra Part V.
240. See supra Part IV.
241. See supra Part IV.
242. See supra Part III.
243. See supra Part V.
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APPENDIX A 
PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
MARKET % of AGREEMENTS WITH PRE-
DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
Credit Card Agreements
244 53% 
Checking Account Agreements 44% 
Prepaid Card Agreements 92% 




Mobile Wireless Contracts 88% 
244. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.3, n.21.
Four defendants [Bank of America, Capital One, Chase, and HSBC,] in the Ross antitrust 
litigation settled claims by agreeing not to use arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts 
for three and one-half years. 05-Civ. 7116 (Southern District of New York).  The credit card 
loans outstanding of the Ross settlers constituted 86.4% of the outstandings not subject to 
arbitration clauses.  If the settling defendants in Ross had continued to use arbitration clauses, 
93.6% of credit card loans outstanding would be subject to arbitration clauses.  None of the 
Ross settlers has resumed using arbitration clauses as of February 2015. 
Id. § 2.3, n.21. 
245. FACTSHEET, supra note 68 (noting the Arbitration Study focused on the “largest”
student loan lenders—not all). 
246. This percentage is based on payday lenders in California and Texas, seemingly the
only places where the CFPB was able to gather data on payday loans.  FACTSHEET, supra note 
68.
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APPENDIX B247 
FLESCH KINCAID GRADE LEVELS 
MARKET AVERAGE FLESCH KINCAID 
GRADE LEVEL FOR 
ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
AVERAGE FLESCH 
KINCAID GRADE LEVEL 
FOR REST OF THE 
CONTRACT 
Credit Card 15.6 11.6 
Checking Account — — 
Prepaid Card 15.0 11.8 
Private Student Loan — — 
Payday Loan 15.4 13.0 
Mobile Wireless — — 
APPENDIX C248 
ARBITRATION CLAUSE FEATURES 




















Credit Cards  99.9% 26% 99% 42% 43% 
Checking 
Accounts  
97% 38% 91% 22% 16% 
Prepaid Cards  100% 26% 94% 26% 31% 
Private Students  98% 84% 99% 28% 29% 
Payday Loans — — — — — 
Mobile Wireless 
Contracts 
99% 14% 99% 15% 0% 
247. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 2.4 (location of data regarding Flesch Kincaid
grade level). 
248. Id. § 2 (location of data for Appendix C).
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APPENDIX D 

























on the merits 
Arbitration
249 1,847 32% 25% 57% 
$5,400





3,462 82 cases- 





















261 — n/a n/a 
249. Id. § 5.2.2.
250. Id. (location of data regarding arbitrations filed and resolutions).  The recovery
averages are based solely on the cases where a decision was reached on the merits by an 
arbitrator, however, they are even further limited because not all of the decisions detailed the 
awards.  Id. 
251. Id. § 6.5.2 (location of data regarding federal individual cases).
252. Id. § 6.2.2.  The data regarding outcomes and claim amounts is based only 1,250
suits—not all of the individual federal lawsuits filed.  Id. 
253. The CFPB noted that though the outcome was unknown, it was consistent with
settlement, so these cases likely settled.  Id. 




258. Id. at § 6.5.1 (location of data regarding class action cases).
259. 470 class actions filed in federal court plus 92 class actions filed in state courts
selected for the study.  Id. 
260. Data indicates these cases were individually settled.  Id. § 1.4.4.
261. This figure is from FI representatives.  Letter from Alan Kaplinsky, supra note 92, at
4. The CFPB’s method used to determine class member recovery was an aggregation that
was then divided, there is not data regarding actual recovery by individual class members.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 8, § 8.3.3.
